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Preaching to the converted?  
Who attended the Camborne, Cornwall Corbyn rally in 
August 2017? 
The political party rally was reinvented by Jeremy Corbyn. Despite retaining the rally as an 
election campaign strategy, Labour calamitously lost the 2019 general election. Did 
something go wrong with this strategy? This paper analyses the results of a survey of 
participants in a rally in Camborne, Cornwall in 2017, close to two marginal constituencies. It 
finds that very few participants were not already dedicated Labour voters. The paper warns of 
the danger of advertising these rallies only through closed mobilisation channels. For 
improved efficacy, rallies in marginal constituencies might more widely advertise using open 
channels to a broader range of people. 
Introduction 
On the morning of 13 December 2019, Labour Party members and supporters woke up to a 
shock. Despite a second impassioned electoral campaign from the Labour Party, which built 
on the momentum of the relatively successful 2017 campaign, Boris Johnson’s Conservative 
Party had won the 2019 general election with a clear majority of 365 seats (gaining 47) 
compared to the Labour Party’s 203 (losing 59 including in its traditional heartlands). This 
was a significantly different result from the 2017 election. Prior to the 2017 election, some 
pundits had predicted a landslide victory for Theresa May’s Conservative government 
(Harrop 2017, Heath and Goodwin 2017: 356, Jackson 2017) and electoral failure for Jeremy 
Corbyn’s Labour Party (Bale 2016). It was deemed a difficult time for the Labour Party: the 
membership was pushing the party to the left, whereas the parliamentary party believed that 
anything other than a centre-left position was electoral suicide (Richards 2016).  
Yet, in comparison to 13 December 2019, there was widespread surprise on 9 June 2017 for a 
different reason. In 2017, election results revealed that the Labour Party increased its share of 
the vote by more than 40%, resulting in a hung parliament: 381 seats for the Conservatives, 
262 for Labour. Labour had achieved its highest vote share increase since the second 
landslide victory of Tony Blair in 2001 (Heath and Goodwin 2017: 346). Jeremy Corbyn’s 
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short-term general election campaign in 2017 was, retrospectively, deemed successful (Dorey 
2017). It was characterised by a very active social media presence and rallies in both safe and 
marginal seats. At the first PMQs after the 2017 general election, Labour MPs – even those 
previously sceptical of the Corbyn project –welcomed Corbyn to the front bench with a 
standing ovation.  The campaign generated what has become known as Corbyn-mania, a 
phenomenon perhaps best illustrated by crowds of thousands of people at Glastonbury 
festival enthusiastically and melodiously chanting ‘Oh Jeremy Corbyn’ to the White Stripe’s 
Seven Nation Army rhythm after a notable speech. His well-attended rallies were heavily 
televised and arguably a key factor – alongside an effective social media campaign – that 
facilitated Labour’s better-than-expected electoral performance in 2017 (Goes 2017).   
This paper is not an exploration into what went wrong for Labour in 2019, but it uses this as a 
starting point for interpreting the effect of rallies on election results in Cornwall. It argues 
that, in the summer/autumn of 2017 – when Labour was preparing itself for a snap election 
that did not take place – and again in the winter of 2019 – in the run up to the general election 
– rallies might have been used more strategically by Labour, especially in Cornish swing 
seats. To help make this argument, the paper analyses a unique data-set generated from a 
survey of participants at a Corbyn rally at The Heartlands, Camborne on 10 August 2017. 
The rally was geographically close to voters in the two swing seats of Camborne and Redruth 
and Truro and Falmouth. It compares these results to what is known more generally about 
Labour Party members and Corbyn supporters, and finds the results to be broadly similar. 
This suggests that the rally involved preaching largely to the converted, and therefore was of 
little utility in helping Labour to gain those relatively few more voters needed to win seats 
from the Conservatives. This argument is further borne out by Labour’s failure to win these 
seats in 2019 after a second rally in Falmouth, which had a similar member/supporter-
targeted mobilisation strategy. 
In 2017, Labour had made significant gains in both of these Cornish constituencies. In Truro 
and Falmouth, Labour took 38% of the vote (up 23% from 2015) compared to the 
Conservatives’ 44%. Labour made more progress – albeit marginal – in 2019 (+0.7%), but 
the Conservatives made bigger gains (+1.6%) and won the seat once more. In Camborne and 
Redruth, the result was even closer in 2017, with Labour achieving 44% of the vote (up by 
19% from 2015) to the Conservatives’ 48%. In 2019 Labour in Camborne and Redruth lost 
8% of votes and the Conservatives gained 6%. 
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When thinking through the notion of preaching to the converted, it is important to consider 
the ways in which targeted local rallies were advertised. We can learn from literature on 
social movement mobilisation that closed communication channels  – i.e. those that rely on 
membership – are unlikely to attract newcomers to a cause (Walgrave and Klandermans 
2010; Saunders et al 2012). The NHS Rally with Jeremy Corbyn and Jon Ashworth on 10 
August 2017 was advertised by South West Labour and then through local party channels, 
only one week before the event. It is also important to note that the event took place on a 
Thursday, perhaps further limiting its reach and appeal for potential participants. A later pre-
2019 election Green Industrial Revolution Rally with Jeremy Corbyn and Angela Rayner, in 
Falmouth on 27 November 2019, was also advertised at short notice and only through closed 
channels. Party members and supporters were the first to be alerted that the event was 
happening and the tickets sold out quickly making it difficult for newcomers to the party to 
hear about the event, let alone attend. Clearly more might have been done to use these rallies 
to reach out to swing voters who might have been able to make a difference to the close 
election results. 
This paper makes a useful contribution to the literature in two ways. First, it provides, for the 
first time, evidence from a systematic survey of the people who actually attended a Corbyn 
rally. Of course, one rally is not representative of all the Corbyn rallies that took place around 
the country (2015-2019), but it is considerably more scientific than a lot of recent guess 
work. This objective measurement of who it is that attends Corbyn rallies contrasts with 
common misrepresentations of Corbyn supporters as unintelligent idealistic youth who have 
oftentimes been belittled to ‘fan club’ status by the commentariat (Allen 2019). Evidence 
suggests that Corbyn supporters are far from this caricature. Many of them are middle class, 
well-educated and fairly active party members. It is misfortunate that Corbyn himself, his 
politics, his supporters and the rally phenomenon sit outside of conventional ways of thinking 
about politics and doing political science in the UK. The fact that they have been 
misunderstood provides even stronger motivation to contribute this data to the political 
science record (Allen 2019).  
 
A related advantage is in the use of an adapted version of the protest survey methodology. 
According to Dryzek (2000: 164), standard survey research ‘can only pick up the echoes of 
past situations in which people were engaged politically’.  Fortunately, there is by now an 
established methodology to contextualise political participation: to ‘catch’ people in the act of 
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participating in a Jeremy Corbyn rally (see, for an applied example, Rainsford 2017). I 
worked with a team of volunteer researchers using an adapted version of the protest survey 
methodology (Klandermans et al 2009) to collect data from a random sample of protest 
participants at a Jeremy Corbyn rally in Camborne, Cornwall, in August 2017. Through 
analysis of this data, the paper provides a profile of the types of individuals that engaged with 
Corbyn rallies. 
 
A second key contribution of this paper is that it allows us to focus on the ‘rally’ as a short-
term election campaign strategy. The role of the rally has frequently been overlooked in 
analyses of campaign strategies in established European democracies in recent decades. This 
is not only because they have been rarely used in electoral campaigns (especially in Britain) 
but also because emphasis is increasingly given to online campaigning (e.g. Gibson et al 
2003, Anstead and Chadwick 2008, Lilleker and Jackson 2010), or to the use of fake news 
and disinformation (see various entries in Jackson et al 2019). It has been noted that Labour 
has sought to target ‘weak’ party voters and marginal seats since the 2001 general election 
(Whiteley and Seyd 2003), but there is clearly a fine line to be drawn between using the rally 
as a means to reinforce existing support and to generate new support. Generating new support 
is clearly more important in marginal seats and yet the evidence suggests that the 
mobilisation strategies of the Cornwall rallies in 2017 and 2019 were reinforcing existing 
support more than generating new support. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I provide more background information about the 
Jeremy Corbyn rally surveyed. Second, I summarise the recently published literature on 
Labour Party and Corbyn supporters. Next, I introduce the adapted Caught in the Act of 
Protest project survey methodology and comment on the representativeness of the mailed 
back survey data. After this, I present analysis of the survey data. In the results section, I 
describe the characteristics of rally participants and also build upon previous literature on 
Labour Party members by comparing and contrasting sub-groups of participants (see 
Methods for more detail). The conclusions reflect on the use of rallies in marginal 
constituencies, stressing the need to reach out beyond preaching to the converted. 
 
The NHS rally with Jeremy Corbyn and Jon Ashworth at which we conducted the participant 
survey analysed for this paper took place on a hot and sunny mid-week day in August in 
Camborne, a small town in southwest Cornwall. Although the event was poorly advertised, it 
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was – for the size of the town – fairly well attended. The population of Camborne is only 
20,010 (2011 Census). This is very small compared to the population of Gateshead, which 
has a population of 120,046, where Jeremy Corbyn drew one of his largest crowds of around 
10,000 people in the run up to the 2017 general election on 5 June (Kahn 2017).  We know 
that the participants came from farther afield than Camborne, but it is true that the population 
in and around Camborne is not only considerably lower but also much more sparsely 
distributed than in Gateshead. To give an indication of the relative success in terms of the 
mobilised turnout, we can divide the estimated rally size by the population of the two towns 
and discover that, proportionately, the Camborne rally was almost as well attended. The 
Gateshead rally was the size of 8.3% of the population of Gateshead. In Camborne, it was not 
far behind at 7.5% of the population. 
 
The rally was billed as an event to send a ‘positive message to those seats we have to win to 
form the next government’. The specific focus was on the NHS, with contributions from 
Shadow Health Secretary Jon Ashworth, staff from the NHS, local party activists and, of 
course, Jeremy Corbyn himself. Not only was the proportion of participants compared to the 
size of the town not much lower than for the huge Gateshead rally, but also most participants 
were enthralled to see their hero speak, and in the chatter I overheard afterwards everyone 
was positive about the experience. But what might we expect to be the socio-demographics of 
this enthusiastic audience? 
 
Who are Labour’s members and Corbyn’s supporters? 
Labour Party members have traditionally been thought of as members of the working class, 
but its voters and its members have become increasingly middle class overtime. Bale et al 
(2019a: 31) found in 2017 that 77% of its members were middle class, that nearly half (48%) 
were women, that they were highly educated (57% have a university degree) and the majority 
(55%) were over 46 years of age. Just over one-third of Labour Party members earn more 
than the median salary for the UK of £30,000. Party membership across all UK political 
parties is predominantly white, making Labour’s white membership of 96% about average. 






Diamond (2016:18) states that Corbyn supporters can be divided into three groups: ‘baby 
boomers’, who were disillusioned with New Labour; young people alienated by austerity and 
high university fees; and white collar employees in the public sector who stood to lose most 
under Conservative policies to shrink the state. These groups were offered hope for a 
‘different vision of society after nearly a decade of spending cuts, tax rises, and missed deficit 
reduction targets’ (Diamond 2017). Indeed, Labour made marked electoral gains in 2017 
among the routine middle class (13 points) and the professional and managerial class (10 
points), as well as capturing large swathes of the youth vote (66%) (Dorey 2017). A 
quantitative analysis of Labour Party members finds that strong supporters of Jeremy Corbyn 
are more likely to be female, left-wing, anti-capitalist and have lower income compared to 
those who support him less (Whiteley et al 2017).   
 
Activity in the Labour Party 
Bale et al’s 2017 survey of Labour Party members (2019a) found that low intensity acts – for 
which people do not need to leave the home – are most commonly participated in by Labour 
Party members. In 2017, 64% ‘liked’ a party post on Facebook, 40% (re)tweeted a party 
message, and 56% displayed an election poster. Medium intensity acts – for which leaving 
home is required but overall commitment is low – were engaged in less commonly. 32% had 
delivered leaflets, 25% attended public hustings and 5% driven voters to the polling station. 
Among the highest intensity acts, canvassing was the most popular activity, engaged in by 
27%, whereas only 4% had helped to run a party committee room, and as few as 0.8% had 
stood as a candidate. Evidence suggests that those engaging in high intensity activism are 
more likely to be pursuing a career in politics (Bale et al 2019b). 
 
Party activity at low, medium and high intensity appears to be differentially distributed across 
Labour Party members who join at different times. Members who joined after the general 
election in 2015 have been more to be more likely to restrict their activism to ‘online 
clictivism’ (Poletti et al 2016). In the words of Bale et al (2017), the new Labour Party 
members ‘talk the talk but they don’t walk the walk’.i  Party members in general – across 
parties – are more likely to be active in off-line activism when they see their political view 
points as more extreme than the party itself, but the same does not hold for on-line activism 




The literature further distinguishes between those who are supporters of the Labour Party 
(they have not joined but they support it in principle) and members. In the 2010 election, 
Labour Party supporters proportionately engaged in two-thirds of the activity of members 
(Fisher et al 2014). However, the aggregated impact of supporters is not to be belittled 
because there are more of them than there are members, hence, Fisher et al’s (2014) 
suggestion that party members are ‘not the only fruit’. Whereas members do proportionately 
more than non-members on an individual level, they do less than supporters in aggregate 
(Webb et al 2017).  
 
Far fewer supporters than members were found to have engaged with the Labour Party on 
social media, to have displayed a poster, handed out leaflets, attended hustings or canvassed.  
(Webb et al 2017). In 2017, over 75% of Labour Party members had engaged in low intensity 
activity, compared to just over 25% of supporters. The proportions of supporters engaging in 
medium (7.0%) and high (2.4%) intensity activity is markedly lower than for supporters 
(52.2% and 37%, respectively). Those more active in election campaigns are socially liberal, 
post-material and have strong feelings about the EU (Webb et al 2017). The literature has less 
to say about the differences between full members and registered supporters. There is, 
however, a sense that registered supporters might be light-touch with regards to party 
activism (Garland 2017).  
 
New joiners and re-joiners 
New joiners and post-2015 re-joiners of the Labour Party members have been found to be 
distinct from those who joined earlier. ‘Belief in the party leadership’ was not a very 
important reason for pre-2015 members to join the Labour Party (Whiteley et al 2017) – only 
43% of those who joined before 2015 agreed it was a ‘very important reason’. This compares 
to 77% of post 2015 general election members who agreed it was a ‘very important’ reason. 
The proportion of those who considered that leadership was important was 82% of those who 
joined during the leadership campaign and 96% of those who joined after Corbyn had 
become leader (Poletti et al 2016). 
 
In addition to their being more supportive of Corbyn, Whiteley et al (2017) also find that new 
recruits to the party are less well educated, more gender balanced (older members were more 
likely to be male), have lower income, class, education and age, and have higher fear of 
poverty. Consequently, recent Labour Party members are sometimes considered to consist 
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disproportionally of the ‘left-behind’. They also consider themselves to be more left-wing. 
However, that they perceive themselves as more left-wing does not mean that they actually 
are. Measures of left-libertarian values tend to have similar distribution across the sub-
samples of old and new members, despite new members placing themselves more firmly on 
the left. It is also important to note that re-joiners – the subset of Labour Party members that 
left the Party for a period, but re-joined in or after 2015 – are also likely to have high levels 
of support for Corbyn (Whiteley et al 2017). This group have been found to be older than 
new members, but are notably more left wing.  
 
In summary, if it is true that Corbyn was ‘preaching to the converted’, we would expect to 
find that the participants in the Heartlands Rally will have similar socio-demographic 
characteristics to Labour Party members, high levels support for the leadership and the 
Party’s manifesto, similar levels of existing activity in and for the Labour Party as members 
and to already be Labour Party voters. Based on this review of the literature on Labour Party 
supporters we might also anticipate the following findings: 
 Corbyn rally attendees with higher levels support for the leadership are more likely to 
female, left-wing, employed in the public sector and be either young or from the baby 
boomer generation compared to those with lower levels of support. 
 Corbyn rally attendees who are not members of the Labour Party are less engaged 
(measured by number of activities and their intensity) in party activity than registered 
supporters / affiliate members, who, in turn, are less engaged than full members. 
 Corbyn rally attendees who joined the party during or after 2015 are more likely to 
support Jeremy Corbyn, to be younger (and consequently less well educated), from 
lower classes and more left-wing than continuing members. 
 
Methods 
The data collection protocols for this study comprise an adaptation of the protest survey 
methodology (Klandermans et al 2009), which has systematic procedures for a) ensuring that 
questionnaires are distributed as randomly as possible and b) for assessing response bias (see 
Walgrave and Verhulst 2011 for a specification). For this study, a team of eight researchers 
worked together in pairs to conduct the survey. Each pair consisted of one experienced 
researcher who interviewed one in exactly every fifteen adult participants as they entered the 
rally site and also gave them a mail back questionnaire, and one less experienced researcher 
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who handed out a mail back questionnaire to one in every three people (excepting the 
fifteenth person, who was covered by the interviewer). The four pairs of researchers were 
stationed at the four main entry points to the site to ensure that every rally participant had a 
random chance of being selected.  
 
We prepared 1,000 survey booklets and 200 short interviews. The interviews contain a small 
sub-set of the questions asked in the mail back questionnaire to allow us to make 
comparisons across samples. In the event, we handed out exactly 900 surveys and 
interviewed 101 people. Overall there were only 9 refusals for the face-to-face interview, 
suggesting a very high response rate for survey of this nature (92%). The team reported in the 
post survey debriefing meeting that there were very few instances when it was impossible to 
keep up with interviewing one person in every 15. We are therefore confident that our 
interviews are a relatively representative sample of those in attendance. We received 336 
completed mail back surveys, providing a very reasonable response rate of 37%. That we 
interviewed one in every 15 participants and conducted 101 interviews allows us to make a 
fairly accurate estimate that the rally consisted of 1,520 participants. 
 
Tests for representativeness of the mail back data are produced by making comparisons 
between the random face-to-face data and the presumably less random, potentially response-
rate biased, mailed back data. However, the differences between the two samples are mostly 
very small (see Table 1), revealing that the mail back data is acceptably representative 
without the need to apply survey weights. This contrasts with most protest surveys, which 
usually find that mail back questionnaires over-represent the politically interested, the better 
educated, women and older participants (Walgrave et al 2016). In the case of the Corbyn rally 
data, binary logistic regression finds no significant predictors of being in the F2F sample 
compared to the mail back one.ii 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
The data from the face-to-face interview and the matching questions in the mail back survey 
are show in Table 1. This data indicates (across both sub-samples) that the Corbyn rally 
participants were disproportionately female (59%) and that over 2/3 of them decided a week 
beforehand to participate in the rally (note that the event was only advertised a week before it 
happened). 92% of rally participants claim that they voted in the general election of 2015, 
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and 96% in 2017. This compares to a 66% and 68% turnout of the electorate, respectively. 
Around one third were attending a rally for the first time. They talk about politics with 
friends and acquaintances, but not too often, and they are very interested in politics. One-
third had a degree (this does not include those who have post-graduate degrees) and the mean 
age is around 50 years. I provide more detail on the demographics of the sample after 
introducing the variables included in the analysis. 
 
Analysis 
The data are mostly presented as descriptive statistics and bi-variate analysis. I also include 
an ordered logit regression to predict intensity of party activity. The analysis focuses 
particularly on respondents’ socio-demographics, their support for the leadership, their 
support for the 2017 Labour manifesto and their activity in the party. The analysis shows the 
small amount of variation in support for the leadership and party activity across socio-
demographic groups and different sub-groups of membership.  Support for the leadership is a 
scale variable comprised by totalling the scores for three questions measured on a 4- or 5-
point scale relating to a) likelihood that Corbyn will be the next prime minister; b) approval 
of Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party; and c) how well Corbyn is doing as leader of the 
Labour Party.iii  
 
Support for the manifesto is measured by rally participants’ agreement (on a 5-point scale) 
with a series of items lifted directly from Labour’s 2017 manifesto. The items included are 
abolition of university fees, fair domestic rent and secured domestic tenancies, free education 
for all regardless of age, increased availability of social housing, commitment to maintaining 
and supporting the NHS as a public service, channelling more resources into crime 
prevention services, public ownership of the railways, HS2, legislation for clean air, 
safeguarding habitats and species in and around the marine environment, prohibiting 
neonicotinoids, ceasing the culling of badgers, greater state support for the arts and culture. 
 
Activity in the party is measured using a classification borrowed, but adapted, from Webb et 
al (2017) and Bale et al (2019a). The survey asked respondents about a range of activities 
undertaken on behalf of the Labour Party in the past 12 months from this list: displayed a 
poster, donated money to the Labour Party, delivered a Labour Party leaflet, attended a 
Labour Party meeting, helped at a Labour Party function, canvassed on the telephone or in 
person on behalf of the Labour Party, liked or shared a Labour Party post on a social 
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networking site and managed or administered a social media page on behalf of or to promote 
the Labour Party. Drawing on Webb et al (2017) and Bale et al (2019a, b) I group these 
activities as low, medium or high intensity. Liking Labour posts on Facebook, displaying a 
poster and donating money to the Party are classified as low intensity activities. These all 
happen inside the home. Medium intensity activities consist of handing out leaflets, attending 
a meeting or helping at a function, these take place outside of the home. Managing or 
administrating a social networking site and canvassing are classified as high intensity. It takes 
substantial effort to manage or administer a social networking campaign, even if it does take 
place inside the home. These high intensity activities require acting as ambassadors for the 
party. The variable is coded so that those who have done a mixture of low, medium and high 
intensity activism are coded into the highest category (i.e. high intensity). Those who have 
done both medium and low intensity activity are categorised in the medium intensity 
category. 
 
Type of membership refers to whether the participants are not at all a member of the Labour 
party, whether they are an affiliate/registered supporter or a full member. Membership is also 
classified in a second way related to when the members joined the Labour Party, if they did at 
all. It is a nominal variable where: 
0 = not a member of the Labour Party 
1 = joined before 2015 and remains a member 
2 = re-joined in 2015 after a lapse in membership (re-joiner) 
3= joined in or after 2015.  
 
Given this paper’s emphasis on the potential effect of the rally in terms of swinging seats 
from Conservative to Labour in Cornwall, it is also important to examine the group I have 
defined as ‘snappers’. These are individuals who did not vote for Labour in 2017, but who 
would have done so should a snap election have been called in Autumn 2017. This group is 
important because there is a strong possibility that the rally will have persuaded them to vote 
for Labour. Moreover, knowing what is distinct about this group can provide strategic 
direction to Labour in relation to which groups of the public to target in rallies in the run up 
to the next general election.  
 
In the ordered logistic regression, the dependent variable is intensity of activity in the Labour 
Party (none, low, medium or high as described above). Independent variables included in the 
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analysis are type of member (non-, new or old), age, whether participants work in professions 
dominated by public sector work (e.g. in education, health and social service), gender, 
authority and left-libertarian scalesiv, social class (using Oesch 8, a nominal scale), support 
for Labour’s manifesto pledgesv  and for Jeremy Corbyn (again scores) and political interest, 
which is an established predictor of party membership and political activity. A full set of 




As we learned from Table 1, Corbyn rally participants in Camborne were disproportionately 
female (notably more so than Labour Party members in general, Bale et al 2019) and nearly 
all of them voted in the general elections of 2015 and 2017. They were highly educated – 
nearly one third had a degree, another quarter had a Masters degree and nearly 5% had 
obtained a PhD. In total, 62% were educated to degree level or higher and the average age 
was 50 years. Very few of the participants surveyed were youth (aged less than 24, just 5%). 
In comparison, more than half were in the baby boomer generation (51%). A reclassification 
of their occupation in Oesch8 class categorisation finds that the most common class category 
was socio-cultural profession (43%) followed by manager (16%) and service workers (15%). 
41% of them had public sector jobs and almost exactly half classified themselves as lower or 
upper middle class (the same as for lower or working class). 
 
Almost exactly one quarter of them resided in the Truro and Falmouth constituency, with 
slightly fewer from Camborne and Redruth (23%) – the constituency in which the rally was 
held. 15% were from the St Ives and Isles of Scilly constituency. Attendees were also there 
from St Austell and Newquay (11.9%), North Cornwall (6.8%), Devon constituencies and 
even farther afield (4.7%). 
 
Women rally attendees were disproportionately distributed across the different party 
membership groupings, being present in marginally greater proportions than men among non-
members and notably greater proportions among re-joiners and those who joined recently 
(around 2/3 of these groups). Women rally participants constituted a minority of long-term 
Labour members, perhaps reflecting shifts in the gender balance of the Labour Party 
membership over time. Not surprisingly, the baby boomers are more likely to be long-term or 
re-joined members, partly as a function of their age. It is important to note that new members 
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of the party were 47% of rally participants, followed by 30% non-members, 9% re-joiners 
and 13% long-term members. Socio-cultural professions were the most commonly held jobs 
across all of the types of membership identified, but most notably so for re-joiners. Managers 
are the second most popular class for long-term members. 27% of long-term members who 
participated in the rally were managers.  
 
Party members from each sub-category are over 50 years of age. In order, from youngest to 
oldest, are the recently joined, non-members, those who re-joined and long-term members. 
Scores on the authority and left-libertarian scales are similar across each sub-group, at around 
11 for the authoritarian scale, and 22 for the left-libertarian scale. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Support for Corbyn 
By-and-large, rally participants were strongly supportive of Corbyn as leader of the Labour 
Party. They thought he was doing a good job of leading the election and thought he stood a 
good chance of becoming the next Prime Minister. The mean score for support for Corbyn 
was 11.9 out of a total of 13, which is extraordinarily high (see Figure 1). The mean support 
score is over 11 for many different subgroups of rally participants – men and women, public 
and private sector workers, youth, baby boomers, those who (re)joined the party at different 
times, and those who are affiliate supporters or members. He was almost universally popular 
among participants: only 6 of the respondents in the whole data set gave him a total support 
score of 9 or less. In contrast, 43% gave him a score of 13 – the maximum possible. Those 
with support above the mean of 11.9 consisted disproportionately of women (61%), those not 
working in public sector jobs (57%) and age groups that are not baby boomers (52%) or 
youth (94%).  
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
The mean support score was the highest for the re-joiners (12.3), followed by the new 
members (12.2), non-members (11.7) and lowest among the long-term members (11.3), 
although only by a small margin, with no significant differences across sub-samples.  Re-
joiners to appear to have been motivated to have re-joined the party because of its turn to the 
left. It is worth noting that this group of members was slightly more youthful (7% under aged 
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24) than the non-members (4% under the age of 24), and those joining for the first time (6%). 
Re-joiners were also distinct in their subjective social class profile. This subgroup lacked 
managers (compared to 15% in the whole sample) and has markedly more socio-cultural 
professionals (63% compared to 42% in the whole sample). Education levels of re-joiners are 
similar to other members (67% have a university degree, 64% for old members and new 
members), but markedly higher than non-members.  
 
If re-joiners and new members were motivated to re-join the party because of their support 
for Jeremy Corbyn as leader, we might expect them to have claimed to be more left-wing 
than their counterparts. This bears out in the data. The mean left-right-self-placement score (a 
0-11 point scale) for those who re-joined or joined for the first time after 2015 was 1.6, 
compared to 2.0 for older members and 2.3 for non-members.vi Interestingly, although the re-
joiners and new members considered themselves to be more left-wing, they did not hold 
stronger left-libertarian views. The correlation between left-right-self-placement and left-
libertarian views was -0.45 for non-members, but only -0.19 for new members and -0.14 for 
old members, suggesting that the latter two groups, especially, were less left-wing than they 
thought they were. 
 
Support for the Labour Party manifesto 
Most participants had moderate to high levels of support for the Labour Party manifesto 
pledges (see Figure 2). Yet this differs markedly across different policy issues. The least 
popular policies, from lowest to highest, were the HS2 railway, supported by only 15.7% of 
rally participants, and two controversial countryside issues: banning neonicotinoids to protect 
bees (62.5%) and ceasing the culling of badgers (67.0%). The other policy pledges were 
supported by around 90% or more of the rally participants (see Figure 3), with little variation 
across sub-samples by membership type. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
 
Activity for the Labour Party 
Ten percent of the participants had not engaged in any of the activities in support of the 
Labour Party that were listed in the questionnaire. 32% had engaged only in low intensity 
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activity, 28% in a combination of low and medium intensity activity and 30% in low, 
medium and high intensity activity.  The majority of those who had not engaged in any 
activity were non-members of the Labour Party. It is important to point out that 30% of the 
respondents were not members of the Labour Party. Those who had engaged only in low 
intensity activity were disproportionate among non-members (48%) or people who had 
recently joined (44%). Medium intensity activity had been carried out disproportionately by 
those who had recently (2015 or later) joined the party for the first time (59%), but also by 
non-members (18%). High intensity activity was dominated by those new to party 
membership (52%) and less so by longer-term members (28%) (Table 3).  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
The ordered logistic regression (Table 4) model found that intensity of party activity among 
rally participants was predicted by their membership (as we also found in the bivariate 
analysis), but also by their support for the Labour manifesto and their interest in politics. All 
other variables included in the model were insignificant.  
 
Snappers 
In the sample, only 27 individuals were snappers, that is, rally participants who did not vote 
Labour in June 2017, but who would have done so in a snap election in the Autumn of 2017. 
By some accounts it might be viewed as impressive to have 27 snappers, but a quick 
examination of their towns of residence reveals that the ‘snappers’ were split too thinly across 
their respective constituencies (St Ives and Scilly Isles [8], Truro and Falmouth [7], St Austell 
and Newquay [4]) as well as other places in even smaller numbers to have had very much 
impact on a swing for Labour. If there was a snap election the rally might have gained 7 new 
voters (the number of snappers) for Truro and Falmouth, whereas 3,792 additional new voters 
would be required for Labour to win the constituency. Camborne and Redruth had only one 
snapper, when it requires 1,580 additional votes in order to win the seat. This is not to suggest 
that it is deemed feasible to attract that many snappers to a rally, but it serves to stress how 
why it would have been beneficial to attract more potential converts. Snappers are very well 
educated (74% are educated to degree level), disproportionately female (71%), 56 years of 
age on average and in work. Differently from rally supporters in general (of which they are a 





Discussion and conclusions 
The findings illustrate a number of similarities between the profiles of Labour Party 
members, of Corbyn supporters and of participants in this rally. Just under half of Labour 
Party members are female (Bale et al 2019), whereas the rally attracted 59% women. The 
difference here can be accounted for with the knowledge 30% of our rally participants were 
not members of the Labour Party and that women are more marginally more likely to be non-
members. The class profile also differs slightly: 77% of Labour members across the country 
are in the middle classes (Bale et al 2019), but only 50% of the respondents were. This might 
reflect the regional economy of Cornwall. However, similar to studies reporting on Labour 
Party member demographics, we did find rally participants to be highly educated (62% had a 
degree, compared to 57% of Labour Party members) and, like Labour Party members, they 
are, on average, in their 50s. We did not ask a survey question about ethnicity, but the white 
composition of crowd was notable. 
 
Our survey of participants found very high levels of support for Jeremy Corbyn as leader of 
the Labour Party across all sub-groups. Contrary to Diamond’s (2016) characterisation of 
Corbynistas, those with above average levels of support for Jeremy Corbyn were not baby 
boomers, the young or white collar workers. However, those rally participants new to the 
Labour Party (post-2015) were a little more youthful than longer-standing members, more 
likely to be women  and were more likely to exaggerate their left-wing ideology, consonant 
with Whiteley et al’s (2017) account of new Labour members. 
 
Chiming with Bale et al (2019a) the regression results and bivariate analysis seem to support 
the idea that intensity of activity on behalf of the Labour Party intensifies with longevity of 
party membership and when people are full members (rather than affiliate members or 
supporters). This is not to belittle those rally supporters who do less for the Labour Party. The 
fact that there are more of them means that – aggregated – they make a very significant 
contribution to Labour Party campaigns (Fisher et al, 2014). 
 
All but 10% of the rally participants had participated in some form of activity on behalf of the 
Labour Party, and nearly all of them had high levels of respect for the leader. These high 
levels of dedication should not be surprising: only the most dedicated Labour and Corbyn 
supporters would attend a rally during the working week on a hot sunny day in the middle of 
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August in Camborne. Contrary to previous work, which suggested that new members ‘do not 
walk the walk’ (Bale et al 2017), this study has found that rally attendees who are new 
members did actually engage in medium intensity activity. It was the non-members who 
mostly stuck to low intensity activities. Long-term members and re-joiners – who we might 
term ‘party stalwarts’ were the membership subgroups most involved in high intensity 
activity. The data also showed that affiliated members and Corbyn supporters are not 
necessarily light touch in their active support for the party. They engage in low and medium 
intensity activity more than full members, whereas high intensity work for the party is more 
common among full members.  
 
One curious finding is that a comparison of left-libertarian scales and left-right-self-
placement suggests that Corbyn supporters over-estimate the extent to which they are left-
wing. Other studies have pointed out that newer members are more left-wing. However, 
previous studies have used only left right self-placement, which constitutes a respondents 
perception of how left-wing they are, rather than a reflection of their actual political ideology. 
It seems probable that the media’s branding of Jeremy Corbyn as ‘hard left’ or ‘Red Labour’ 
has encouraged new members to rate themselves as more left-wing than they really are. This 
is, potentially, a weakness of other work that relies on left right self-placement. 
 
Another interesting outcome of this investigation is the relatively small number of people 
who could have contributed to a swing vote, who I call ‘snappers’. The advertising of the 
event was kept within Labour circles and there could have been much more scope for the 
event to have reached out beyond the usual suspects. By some accounts, the presence of 27 
‘snappers’ in the audience is impressive, but, when spread across constituencies, there were 
certainly not enough to create a ripple effect to reach out to the thousands who would be 
needed to persuade to vote Labour in order to swing the vote away from the Conservatives 
and towards the Labour Party. The similar mobilisation strategy through closed channels 
(Walgrave and Klandermans 2010) likely did little to maximise the impact of the 2019 rally 
in Falmouth. 
 
The literature sends us strong signals that that campaigning in marginal seats is likely to be 
fruitful (Whiteley and Seyd 1992), but the effects are somewhat dampened by preaching to 
the converting. Of course, there are benefits in motivating local existing audiences: 
‘recruitment, retention and energizing local party members … can bring significant electoral 
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benefits to the Labour Party’ (Whiteley and Seyd 1992: 594), but the stakes for the Labour 
Party have been high in Cornwall at recent elections. These rallies appear to have missed an 
important opportunity for reaching out beyond the converted. More strategically targeted use 
of the rally, targeting participation not just of youthful / first time voters, but also of the older 
female voters who identify as working class (which comprised the majority of our 
‘snappers’), would have been beneficial. Using open mobilisation channels (beyond Labour) 
to advertise the rallies would be beneficial for this endeavour. 
 
Labour might also learn from surveys like this a lesson or two about the appeal of its 
manifesto among its most ardent supporters. The Camborne Corbyn rally participants mostly 
highly supported the policy propositions taken from the manifesto. The slight reservations 
expressed about ceasing badger culling and banning neo-nicotinoids – compared to the other 
much more popular policy propositions – could be due to parochial factors. Cornwall has a 
strong farming heritage, as well as a mining one. By far the least popular policy was HS2, 
which was only supported by 16% of rally participants, compared to national polls that 
suggest public support is 20-30%. It is hard for Cornwall residents – cut off by slow train 
lines to London – to have much support for levelling up initiatives that keep Cornwall 
peripheral. 
 
This paper makes an important contribution to the literature, but it would be remiss to not 
also mention some weaknesses. On the positive side, I successfully adapted the protest survey 
methodology to apply it to a Jeremy Corbyn rally. The mail back sample was extraordinarily 
similar to the random interview sample. What I initially thought was a major benefit in terms 
of the sample representativeness, became one of the more difficult aspects to deal with. I 
soon came to learn that at least part of the reason that for this similarity was the relative 
homogeneity of the crowd. This makes it difficult to conduct convincing analyses on sub-
groups of rally participants. This contrasts with previous work on protest, where it has been 
relatively easy to spot differences in gender, age, left-right attitudes and political interest 
among novices, returners, repeaters and stalwarts (Saunders et al 2012). 
 
The relative homogeneity of Cornwall Corbyn rally attendees is provides an interesting 
challenge to – at least for Cornwall – inaccurate caricatures of Corbynistas. What we have 
been unable ascertain is whether this homogeneity of supporters is unique to Cornwall. One 
obvious way of extending the study is to conduct similar survey work of other left-wing party 
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rallies in different constituencies. It may well be that the most interesting comparison will be 
across towns rather than across sub-groups of rally participants. 
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Table 1. Test for representativeness of the mail back data 




Female  59 59 
Decided to participate a week ago  69 68 
Voted in 2015 GE  93 92 
Voted in 2017 GE 97 96 
Rally novices 44 31 
Talks politics often 35 43 
Very interested in politics  73 74 
UG degree (not higher)  31 33 
Mean satisfaction with democracy (0-10 
scale)  
3 3 


















Female  55 35 67 64 182 
Baby boomers 48 68 63 44 161 
Class      
Socio-cultural 
profession 36 42 63 41 129 
Service 
workers 22 2 3 17 49 
Managers 11 27 0.0 18 48 
Education      
UG degree 35 41 23 31 103 
PG or prof 
qual 23 23 43 33 95 
Age (mean) 54 61 57 52 315 
Authority 13 12 11  11 276 
Left-lib 22 22 23 23 316 




Table 3. Intensity of party activity by type of party membership 












activity n 26 0 1 3 30 
 % 87 0 3 10 100 
Low  n 49 3 5 45 102 
 % 48 3 5 44 100 
Medium n 16 10 11 53 90 
 % 18 11 12 59 100 
High n 6 27 13 49 95 
 % 6 28 14 52 100 
Total  n 97 40 30 150 317 
  % 31 13 10 47 100 
 




Table 4. Ordered logistic regression predicting intensity of activity in the party (none, 
low, medium or high) 
 
  Coefficient SE z P>|z| 
Type of member (baseline non-member)       
Affiliate / supporter 1.74 0.45 3.83 0.00 
Full member 2.78 0.40 6.86 0.00 
Age 0.01 0.01 1.27 0.20 
Public sector job -0.70 0.37 -1.90 0.06 
Gender (male) -0.17 0.31 -0.53 0.59 
Authoritarian scale 0.02 0.05 0.34 0.73 
Left-libertarian scale -0.03 0.06 -0.46 0.65 
Social class (Oesch 8)     
Manager   -0.33 0.83 -0.40 0.69 
Office Clerks   -0.73 1.18 -0.62 0.53 
Petit Bourgeoisie   -0.08 0.91 -0.09 0.93 
Production Worker   -0.09 0.90 -0.10 0.92 
Service Workers   -0.71 0.87 -0.82 0.42 
Socio-Cultural Profession   -0.11 0.80 -0.14 0.89 
Technical Profession   -1.25 0.95 -1.31 0.19 
Support for Jeremy Corbyn 0.17 0.12 1.42 0.16 
Support for Labour manifesto 0.13 0.04 3.01 0.00 
Political interest 0.96 0.33 2.96 0.00 
/cut1 | 10.0 2.9     
/cut2 | 12.7 3.0   
/cut3 | 14.4 3.0   
 
Notes: The model has 192 valid cases. Log likelihood -201.10. RE chi2(17) = 97.01***, 














































State support for sport
More resources to tackle crime
Publicly owned railways
Abolish tuition fees












Appendix: Variable measurement 
Variable type and name Survey question or computation Coding 
Socio-demographics   
Age In what year were you born? 2017-year born 
Babyboomer Computed: born 1946-1964 0= no 
1= yes 
Youth Computed: born1992-2001 0= no 
1= yes 




3= prefer not tosay 
Education What is your highest level of 
education? 
0= none, did not complete primary 
education 
1= primary 
2= GCSEs or equivalent 
3= A’Levels or equivalent 
4= Foundational degree / HNC 
5= Degree: BA/BSc 
6= Masters of other PG 
qualification 
7= PhD 
Employment What is your employment 
situation? Tick as many as apply. 
I work fulltime 
I work part-time 
I am freelance/self-employed 
(without staff) 
I am self-employed (with staff) 
I study fulltime 
I am unemployed/between jobs 
I am retired 




Occupation What is your occupation, or what 
was your last occupation 
String 
Employees In your main job do / did you have 
responsibility for supervising the 
work of other (or your own) 
employees 
0= no 
1= yes for 1-9 persons 
2= yes for 10 persons or more 
Oesch Social class calculation, derived 
from occupation and employees 
1= large employers 
2= technical profedssions 
3= (associate) managers 
4= socio-cultural professions 
5= petit bourgeoisie 
6= production workers 
7= office clerks  
8= service workers 
Subjective social class People sometimes describe 
themselves as belonging to the 
working class, the middle class, or 
the upper or lower class. Would 
you describe yourself as belonging 
to the …? 
1 = upper class 
2= upper middle class 
3= lower middle class 
4= working class 
5= lower class 
6= none 
Support for the leadership   
31 
 
JC for PM How likely or unlikely do you 
think it is that Jeremy Corbyn will 
ever become prime minister? 
1= not at all 
2=  not very 
3= somewhat likely 
4= he will be our next PM 
5= I do not know (re-coded as 
missing) 
Approval of JC To what extent do you approve or 
disapprove of Jeremy Corbyn as 
leader for the Labour Party? 
1= strongly disapprove 
2= disapprove 
3= neither approve nor disapprove 
4= approve 
5= strongly approve 
6= I do not know (re-coded as 
missing) 
Leadership performance Do you think that Jeremy Corbyn 
is doing well or badly as leader of 
the Labour Party? 
1= very badly 
2= badly 
3= not  badly or well 
4= well 
5= very well 
6= I do not know (re-coded as 
missing) 
Support for the leadership  An aggregated scale of JC for PM, 
Approval of JC and Leadership 
performance. 
Support for the manifesto   
Support for policy proposals To what extent do you support or 
oppose the following policy 
proposals? 




3= neither oppose or support 
4= support 
5= strongly support 
6= I do not know (re-coded as 
missing) 
Support for the manifesto  An aggregated scale of support for 
policy proposals 
Activity in the party   
Have you Have you, in the past 12 months 
… 
Displayed a Labour Party election 
poster 
Donated money to Labour Party 
funds 
Delivered Labour Party or 
candidate leaflets 
Attended a Labour Party meeting 
Helped at a Labour Party function 
Participated in phone or door-to-
door canvassing on behalf of the 
Labour Party 
Liked the Labour party or shared 
its posts on social media 
Managed or administered a social 
media page or network in support 
of the Labour Party 
1=yes 
0=n0 
Intensity of activism See pages 10-11 for explanation None= 0 
Low= 1 
Medium= 2  
High= 3 
Membership   
Type of member Are you a member, supporter, or 
affiliate of the Labour Party? 




1= I am a member of the Labour 
party 
2= I am a registered supporter of 
the Labour party 
2= I am an affiliated supporter 
(through a trade union or socialist 
society) 
Re-joiner If you are a member, supporter or 
affiliate, in which year did you 
first join the Labour Party? 
If your membership, supporter or 
affiliate status has ceased for any 
period of time, please indicate the 
approximate years when it stopped 
and restarted. 
0= not a member of the Labour 
Party 
1= joined before 2015 and 
remains a member 
2= re-joined in 2015 after a lapse 
in membership (re-joiner) 
3= joined in or after 2015.  
 
Ideology   
Left-libertarian To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements? 
Government should redistribute 
income from the better off to those 
who are less well off 
Big business takes advantage of 
ordinary people 
Ordinary working people do not 
get their fair share of the nation’s 
wealth 
There is one law for the rich and 
one for the poor 
Management will always try to get 
the better of employees if it gets 
the chance 




5= strongly agree 
 
The variable is an aggregated 
index. 
Authoritarian Young people do not have enough 
respect for traditional British 
values 
For some crimes, the death 
penalty is the most appropriate 
sentence 
Schools should teach children to 
obey authority 
Censorship of films and 
magazines is necessary to uphold 
moral standards 
People who break the law should 
be given tougher sentences 




5= strongly agree 
 
The variable is an aggregated 
index. 
Left-right self-placement In politics people sometimes talk 
of “left” and “right”. Where would 
you place yourself on this scale, 
where 0 means left and 10 means 
right? 
0-10 scale 









i It should be noted that the timing of this survey meant that new members did not have the opportunity to be 
active in the election campaign – they joined after the 2015 election and the study was published before the 
2017 election. 
ii DV= 1 for face-to-face, 0 for mail back.  Chi-square tests of model coefficients = 1.24 sig. 999, Nagelkerke R 
Square = 0.005, none of the variables are significant. The lowest p-value is 0.4. 
iii Cronbach’s alpha for this variable is reasonable at 0.59. Due to the low number of items, I also ran a 
Spearman Brown reliability analysis, which has a similar score of 0.58. 
iv Authoritarianism is measured by the items ‘young people do not have enough respect for traditional British 
values’, ‘for some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence’, ‘schools should teach children to 
obey authority’, ‘censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards’ and ‘people who 
break the law should be given stiffer sentences’. Each is measured on a five point agree/disagree Likert scale 
and summed to make the authoritarian scale.  Cronbach’s reliability coefficient is 0.72. Left-libertarianism is 
measured by the following items summed in the same way: ‘government should redistribute income’, ‘big 
business takes advantage of ordinary people’, ‘ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s 
wealth’, ‘there is one law for the rich and one law for the poor’ and ‘management will always try to get the 
better of employees’. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.65. Factor analysis and PCA failed to find a sensible solution. 
Instead, I decided to retain them as two scale variables. Authority scale correlates modestly and positively (0.29) 
with left-right self-placement (where 0=most left-wing and 10=most right-wing). Left- libertarian score 
correlates modestly and negatively (-0.27) with left-right self-placement. 
v  Cronbach’s alpha 0.70   
vi  One way ANOVA F=5.96, significant at the 0.001 level. 
                                                          
